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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the potential implications of national policies that lead to a sudden 
increase of wind power in the electricity mix for interconnected European electricity markets. 
More specifically, it examines market integration before and after the closures of eight 
nuclear power plants that occurred within a period of a few months in Germany during 2011. 
The short- and- long run interrelationships of daily electricity spot prices, from November 
2009 to October 2012, in: APX-ENDEX, BELPEX, EPEX-DE, EPEX-FR, NORDPOOL, 
OMEL and SWISSIX; and wind power in the German system are analysed. Two MGARCH 
(Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) models with 
dynamic correlations are used to assess spot market behaviour in the short run, and a 
fractional cointegration analysis is conducted to investigate changes in the long-run behaviour 
of electricity spot prices. Results show: positive time-varying correlations between spot prices 
in markets with substantial shared interconnector capacity; a negative association between 
wind power penetration in Germany and electricity spot prices in the German and 
neighbouring markets; and, for most markets, a decreasing speed in mean reversion.  
Keywords: electricity market integration, energy transition, fractional integration, time-
varying correlations, volatility transmission  
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Common goals in European energy policy are security of supply, affordability and climate 
change. An integrated electricity market is seen as a means to address these objectives. 
Nonetheless, national policies that affect wholesale prices in one electricity market can impact 
the process of integration. The present study investigates short- and- long run associations of 
electricity day-ahead prices and wind power penetration in German market, which is the 
largest and most liquid in Europe, with other European markets, by comparing the periods of 
one year before and after the closures of eight nuclear plants that followed the 13th Gesetz zur 
Änderung des Atomgesetz (Nuclear Phase-Out Act).  
A consensus on European energy policy could promote cleaner energy mixes, optimise 
complementarities, lead to dynamic pricing and align grid investment strategies (Boeckers et 
al., 2013; Hooper and Medvedev, 2009). Yet, in 2011, a unilateral course was taken in 
Germany that potentially altered wholesale electricity prices beyond its borders. As hinted by 
Germany’s Environment Minister a year after, unintended consequences were possible: ‘It 
was not possible to discuss the consequences of such a decision with Germany's neighbours. 
Now is the time for that.’ (Peter Altmaier, European Energy Review, 2012). Indeed, Germany 
is Europe’s largest economy and is committed to reduce emissions between 80 to 95% below 
the level in 1990 by 2050, of which 21% has since been achieved (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2013). Its energy transition, Energiewende, has led to considerable growth in 
intermittent renewable energy sources (RES-E), and wind power capacity increased from 
183MWh in 1992 to 31.308MWh in 2012, so that Germany had a third of the installed EU 
wind power capacity in 2012 (EWEA, 2012). Consequently, with the closure of eight nuclear 
plants in a short period, the German electricity mix changed significantly; the share of other 
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technologies increased, most noticeably wind power, as will be highlighted in the next 
section.  
The possibility of unintended consequences from isolated national energy policies that alter 
the electricity mix in interconnected electricity markets motivates this study. In the next 
section, the contextual background is described in greater detail. Section three reviews the 
literature on the implications of growing RES-E for electricity price behaviour, price volatility 
transmission and market integration. Section four sets the hypotheses to be tested. Section 
four describes the methodology and data. The results are reported in section five. Section six 
discusses the main findings, and section seven concludes the paper.   
2. Germany’s electricity mix and trade flows following the Nuclear Phase Out  
The decommissioning of eight nuclear power plants in Germany as a response to the events in 
Fukushima led to a 23% reduction in gross electricity generation capacity from nuclear (Öko 
Institut, 2013). Given an increase in the share of intermittent RES-E in the German electric 
system, secure capacity, which is the capacity that is available 99% of the time, decreased. 
Figure 1 illustrates the secured and available electricity generation capacities in Germany in 
January 2011 in GW, before the closures. At that time, of the total installed RES-E capacity 
(51.5GW), only 9% (4.8GW) was classified as secure. In the case of conventional plants, 
availability is subject to outages, revision and failures. Consequently, from the total installed 
available capacity of 160.2GW only 58% (93.1GW) was secure. Given a peak-load demand in 
Germany of 80.6GW in 2011, the reserve margin before the closures of the eight nuclear 
power stations was equal to 12.5GW (BDEW, 2011). This value exceeded the adequate 
reserve margin of 7GW, which is suggested by ENTSO-E. However, after the closures of 
eight nuclear plants in 2011, the reserve margin decreased to 6.2GW, which is below the 
security threshold (ENTSO-E, 2011). 
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-Figure 1 here- 
Until August 2011, Germany had been a net exporter of electricity with stable commercial 
flows. Exports were generally to the Benelux countries, which have a high proportion of 
variable peak electricity sources, such as coal- and gas-fired plants. Germany imported 
electricity from France, mostly produced by nuclear plants, and the Czech Republic, which in 
2010 had high proportions of fossil fuel-based (54.8% or 47.1TWh) and nuclear (32.6% or 
28TWh) generation (European Commission, 2012). Electricity flows with Denmark, Sweden 
and Poland depended on the availability of wind power (BDEW, 2011).  
After August 2011, with lower reserve margins, trade patterns changed. In the six weeks that 
followed the announcement and the reduction of total net capacity by 6.305MW, Germany 
became a net-importer of electricity (BDEW, 2011). However, the decommissioning of the 
nuclear power capacities in Germany coincided with the seasonal shift in its electricity trade 
with neighbouring markets: electricity was traditionally exported in the winter and imported 
during the summer, when there is greater availability of hydro and lower demand for nuclear 
in neighbouring markets (Öko Institut, 2013). Nevertheless, when considering a longer period 
(one year before and one year after 6th of August 2011), Germany remained a net exporter. 
Overall imports rose by 894GWh, while the increase in net exports was 5103GWh (ENTSO-
E, 2014). Trade flows actually increased, and the expectation of greater imports was not 
confirmed. The reduction in electricity generation from nuclear was offset in the annual 
balance by two thirds, through increased generation from RES-E (+20.2TWh) (Öko Institut, 
2013). In addition, when comparing statistics of newly commissioned wind turbines in the 
years 2009/2010 to 2011/2012, a 30% increase in capacity is observed (BWE, 2014). In short, 
favourable weather conditions and strong investments in wind farms further increased the 
share of electricity generated by RES-E in Germany. 
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3. RES-E and Electricity Market Integration in Europe 
Several studies have addressed growing RES-E integration (e.g. Gross et al., 2006; Henriot 
and Glachant, 2013; Holttinen et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007), but they mainly highlighted the 
need for secure reserve capacity due to the intermittent nature of wind power. Some authors 
(e.g., Bode and Groscurth, 2006; Gil et al., 2012; Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010; Neubarth et 
al., 2006; Nicolosi, 2010; Ray et al., 2010; Saenz de Miera et al., 2008; Sensfuß et al., 2008), 
however, observed that increasing wind power penetration is negatively correlated with 
electricity spot prices.  In high-wind scenarios, given the merit order of dispatch, more 
expensive generators have very low load factors (Claudius et al., 2014; Forrest and MacGill; 
2013, Sensfuß et al., 2008; Woo et al., 2011, Würzburg et al., 2013), and therefore electricity 
wholesale prices are expected to drop. However, a side-effect of intermittent RES-E on 
wholesale markets is an increase in day-ahead and intra-day price volatility, since the merit-
order curve, which in most cases should determine price, can change significantly between 
high- and- low wind scenarios. Price risk, to which generators and suppliers are exposed in 
liberalised markets, increases due to the limited storability of electricity, which implies 
instantaneous balance of supply and demand, and the high variability of wind power 
(Paraschiv et al., 2014). Not surprisingly, Traber and Kemfert (2011), when investigating the 
German market, found that the incentive to invest decreased for all technologies with the 
development of wind generation. Consequently, with high wind power penetration levels, 
concerns over security of supply call for incentives in flexible generation. However, as 
Spiecker and Weber (2013) argued, the need for more flexible generation capacity can be 
reduced by grid extensions and market coupling. Still, studies (e.g. Neuhoff et al. 2013; 
Oggioni et al. 2014) that investigated wind power integration policies suggest that priority 
dispatch, as in Germany, can hinder market integration. As a whole, the literature suggests 
that increasing intermittent RES-E penetration can lead to higher spot price volatility at least 
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in the local market, and this expectation should be considered when investigating integrated 
markets.  
To date, multi-market empirical studies appear to have neglected the possible effects of RES-
E generated electricity in interconnected regions. Considering the Australian electricity spot 
markets, Worthington et al. (2005) showed no price spillover across markets, but significant 
volatility transmission in nearly all markets. Higgs (2009) observed that the less direct the 
interconnection between markets, the lower the volatility spillover between them. By contrast, 
when Zareipour et al. (2007) compared different volatility indices in four interconnected 
North American electricity markets (Ontario, New England, New York, and PJM), they 
observed that volatility increased in the direction of well-connected, less mature or smaller 
markets.  
Considering European electricity markets, which are the subject of the present study, 
Solibakke (2008) investigated volatility transmission between the daily German electricity 
price index Phelix and spot prices from Nord Pool between 2000 and 2006, and found strong 
cross-market correlations that lasted for up to three days. Similarly, Le Pen and Sévi (2010) 
observed returns and volatility spillover effects in the German, Dutch and British forward 
electricity markets. Bunn and Gianfreda (2010), however, analysed volatility interactions 
between five European spot and forward markets (British, Dutch, French, German, Spanish), 
and concluded that volatility transmission decreased with proximity to the maturity of the 
contracts. Overall these studies highlight that price volatility can spread across interconnected 
electricity markets. Consequently, long-run electricity price dynamics may also become more 
volatile and impact the convergence to the single market, which following EU directives 
should be completed by 2015. 
A growing body of literature has been focusing on evaluating electricity market convergence 
in Europe. Most studies adopt the Law of One Price (Fetter, 1924) as the core theoretical 
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foundation for common long-run dynamics. The set of markets, periods examined and the 
status-quo of market integration that is inferred vary significantly between studies. Some 
authors concluded that electricity wholesale prices are converging (e.g. Armstrong and Galli, 
2005; Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010; Kalantzis and Milonas, 2010; Robinson 2008), but that 
convergence may be stronger in periods of peak demand (support Armstrong and Galli’s, 
2005) or in directly well-connected markets (Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010). By contrast, recent 
assessments (e.g. de Menezes and Houllier, 2014; Pellini, 2012, Pinho and Madaleno, 2011) 
suggest less convergence in electricity spot prices, and at least two of these studies concluded 
that market integration in Europe remains in its infancy. Nonetheless, of particular relevance 
to the present study, Bollino et al.’s (2013) analysis of price convergence in four markets 
(Austria, Germany, France and Italy) between 2004 and 2010 showed that German electricity 
prices acted as a signal for neighbouring markets.  
Since it can be argued that in the liberalised EU markets, common long-run price dynamics 
would reflect the cost of generation in the region, several studies have assessed the link 
between energy sources and electricity prices (e.g. Asche et al. (2006), Bollino et al. (2013), 
Bosco et al. (2010), Bosco (2006), Emery and Liu (2002) Gjolberg (2001), Kalantzis and 
Milonas (2010), Mjelde and Besseler (2009), Mohammadi (2009), Roques et al. (2008), 
Sensfuβ et al. (2008), Sereletis and Herbert (1999)). In this line of research, Aatola et al. 
(2013) were the first to consider RES-E policies in their assessment of electricity market 
convergence. Using daily electricity and carbon forward price data from 2003 to 2011, the 
authors concluded that electricity market integration in Europe was increasing over time, and 
that carbon prices might have had a positive but uneven effect on integration. Subsequently, 
Castagneto-Gissey’s (2014) analysis of electricity and carbon prices in the year-ahead energy 
markets during ETS Phase II highlighted that electricity prices in the EU can be driven by 
coal prices, but also that generators may excessively charge for the cost of carbon. It showed 
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that German and Nord Pool electricity prices increased 35% above the competitive threshold 
given a unit increase in costs. Although electricity prices could have been driven by the 
generators with greater emissions, generators might have also pushed for higher electricity 
prices.  The level of competition is therefore an important factor in the determination of 
wholesale electricity prices and may also moderate the associations between coal and 
electricity prices in European markets. Moreover, Brunner (2014) noted that the relationship 
between electricity demand and spot prices in Germany is likely to be moderated by the 
supply of RES-E. 
To date, the different streams of literature reviewed have little in common. Studies on the 
integration of RES-E on price dynamics have generally focused on one specific market. 
Studies that assessed short-run interrelationships or price convergence in the long run have 
neglected the potential effects of RES-E penetration. The present study links these streams of 
literature, by focusing on how wind power penetration in the German market may have 
impacted spot price behaviour in Germany and connected markets. In doing so, it assesses the 
implications for the development of the Pan-European electricity market. The next section 
considers potential implications of the surge in wind power generation in the German 
electricity mix, which followed the start of the implementation of the German Nuclear-Phase 
Out, and sets the hypotheses to be tested in this study. 
4. Implications of increasing shares of RES-E in Germany for EU electricity markets 
The drop in base-load capacity and the increasing share of RES-E in the German system, 
described above, may have led to greater price fluctuations. Even if reserve margins were 
sufficient, offsetting the decommissioned nuclear power generation by intermittent RES-E 
might have resulted in more volatile electricity output and spot prices. In periods of low levels 
of wind power generation, there would be a shift towards the steeper slope in the German 
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merit-order curve and therefore, small changes in demand or supply could lead to price 
spikes. Indeed, as reported in the preceding section, a higher proportion of wind power in the 
electricity mix has been linked to lower average prices and increases in price volatility within 
one market. Moreover, in interconnected markets, a sudden surge in the share of wind-
generated electricity in a market can decrease electricity prices not only locally but also in 
connected markets, because rational players recognise profitable arbitrage opportunities. By 
buying electricity in the cheaper market, price shocks can then be transmitted between 
neighbouring markets, subject to available transmission capacity. Analogously, a sudden 
decrease in the share of wind-generated electricity may increase electricity imports in the 
German market, which is not only central but also the most liquid in the region. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis1a: Following Germany’s nuclear power station closures in 2011, stronger 
associations between wind power penetration and spot price movements are observed. 
In theory, in integrated and efficient electricity markets without network congestions, prices 
and, as result their volatility, should be identical.  As described above, interconnection and 
geographical proximity have been found to be associated with the convergence of electricity 
spot prices in Europe. Given the interconnection between the German and neighbouring 
markets, it is therefore hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 1b: After Germany’s nuclear power station closures in 2011, price volatility 
transmission across EU electricity markets increased. 
4.1 Implications for electricity spot price dynamics 
The speed of mean reversion is useful for regulators as an indicator of market resilience, 
because it quantifies how quickly the generation side can react to unexpected events by 
ramping generation capacity up or down. With increasing electricity market integration, prices 
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should converge and the speed with which prices revert to their mean should increase as an 
integrated EU electricity system relies on a larger generation portfolio. Yet, shifts in energy 
policies that affect the electricity mix impact price differentials (competitiveness) locally and 
in interconnected markets. With a merit-order curve that varies with the amount of wind-
generation, electricity spot prices are more volatile, and consequently the speed with which 
they may converge to a mean is likely to be affected. Persistence of price spikes (slower mean 
reversion) would signal reductions in system flexibility, as unexpected changes in demand or 
supply levels are less easily overcome. It is therefore hypothesised:  
Hypothesis 2a: After Germany’s nuclear power station closures in 2011, the speed with which 
electricity spot prices revert to the mean has decreased. 
4.1.1 Co-integration of EU electricity markets 
The German electricity market is the largest in Europe. As highlighted above, greater spot 
price volatility in the larger market can impact price differentials with interconnected markets, 
especially if markets are unable to quickly respond to price signals. Hence: 
Hypothesis 2b: After Germany’s nuclear power station closures, less integration between EU 
electricity spot markets is observed. 
5. Methods 
The dataset is divided into two subsamples to test the hypotheses, with 6 August 2011 being 
the date by which eight nuclear plants had been closed permanently following the timeline 
legislated on 30 June 2011 (BMU, 2011). For assessment of changes in associations 
(Hypotheses 1a and 1b) and in mean reversion (Hypothesis 2a), the Chow (1960) breakpoint 
test is employed. This test entails a one-sided t-test, whose alternative hypothesis is defined 
according to the hypothesised direction of change.  
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5.1 Assessing changes in correlation and volatility transmission  
In order to investigate changes in the association between wind penetration levels and spot 
prices and volatility transmission between spot markets, as implied by hypotheses 1a and 1b, 
two alternatives of Multivariate GARCH models are estimated on two sets of variables: (1) 
log-returns of spot prices and actual wind power penetration levels, (2) log-returns of spot 
prices and planned (expected) wind power penetration levels. Given the time-varying 
assumptions, dynamic conditional correlation models are used, the mean of estimated 
correlations in each period (pre and post 6 August 2011) is computed and changes are then 
evaluated via a breakpoint test. 
5.1.1 Dynamic Conditional Correlation Models 
Tse and Tsui’s (2002) proposal of a dynamic conditional correlation model is considered, 
which hereafter is referred to as TTDCC. According to this model, the dynamic conditional 
covariance matrix at time t is such as follows:  
ܪ௧ ൌ ܦ௧Γ௧ܦ௧ ൌ ߩ௜௝௧ሺ݄௜௜௧ ௝݄௝௧ሻభమ,             (1) 
where 
ܦ௧ ൌ ݀݅ܽ݃ሺ݄ଵଵ௧భమ … ݄௄௄௧భమ ሻ                    (2) ݄௜௜௧  is the conditional variance of the univariate GARCH model for variable I, as follows: 
݄௜௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵߝ௜௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚଶ݄௜௜௧ିଵ , 1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݆ ൑ ܭ, ݐ ൌ 1, … , ܰ;                                                          (3)                            
 ߚ଴, ߚଵ, ߚଶ  are parameters to be estimated, K is the number of variables in the model and N is 
the number of observations in the estimation period. Γ௧ is the KxK symmetric time-varying 
positive definite conditional correlation matrix whose diagonal elements are ߩ௜௜ ൌ 1 , ׊݅, and 
is defined as follows:  
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Γ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠଵ െ ߠଶሻΨ ൅ ߠଶΨ௧ିଵ ൅ ߠଵΓ௧ିଵ,             (4) 
 ߠଵ and ߠଶ are non-negative constants, such that ߠଵ ൅ ߠଶ ൏ 1. Ψ is a constant positive definite 
parameter matrix of ones, and Ψ௧ିଵ is a function of the lagged standardised residuals ߦ௜௧, such 
that: 
Ψ௧ିଵ,௝௜ ൌ ∑ క೔,೟ష೘ಾ೘సభ కೕ,೟ష೘ටሺ∑ క೔,೟ష೘మಾ೘సభ ሻሺ∑ కೕ,೟ష೘మ ሻಾ೘సభ                                                                                       (5) 
and 
ߦ௜௧ ൌ ݁௜௧/݄௜௜௧భమ                        (6) 
In addition, Engle’s (2002) alternative dynamic conditional correlation matrix is estimated, 
i.e.:  
Γ௧ ൌ ݀݅ܽ݃ ቆݍଵଵ௧ିభమ … ݍ௄௄௧ିభమ ቇ ൫ሺ1 െ ߠଵ െ ߠଶሻ തܳ ൅ ߠଵߦ௧ିଵߦ௧ିଵᇱ ൅ ߠଶܳ௧ିଵ൯݀݅ܽ݃ ቆݍଵଵ௧ିభమ … ݍ௄௄௧ିభమ ቇ    (7) 
where തܳ is the ܭxܭ unconditional correlation matrix of ߦ௧, and ߠଵ and ߠଶ are non-negative 
parameters satisfying ߠଵ ൅ ߠଶ ൏ 1 (Higgs, 2009). Hereafter, this formulation is referred to as 
the EDCC model. 
 5.2. Assessing price dynamics: Fractional Integration 
Long-run associations of electricity spot prices can be obscured because of the presence of 
large spikes in the data. Consequently, the time series needs to be smoothed before assessing 
their long-run dynamics. The study conducted by Trück et al. (2007) is referred to for the 
outlier treatment that is adopted. Outliers are defined as values that exceed or fall below the 
rolling window mean average by three standard deviations over a one-month period. The 
proportions of outliers varied with the time series, the threshold and length of the moving 
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average were decided so that the number of observations to be replaced would not exceed five 
per cent of the sample. Four iterations were conducted, according to which the Nordic and 
German spot markets had the lowest proportion of outliers (1.1%) while the French spot 
market had the highest (4.5%). The identified outliers were replaced by a mean average of 
lags and leads within one month.  
In order to assess changes in mean reversion (Hypothesis 2a), the concept of fractional 
integration (Robinson, 1994) is utilised, i.e.: A process ܺ௧ is said to be integrated of order d, 
I(d), if its fractional difference, ሺ1 െ ܮሻௗܺ௧, is a stationary or mean- reverting I(0) process. 
The fractional difference operator is the following:  
ሺ1 െ ܮሻௗ ൌ ∑ ୻ሺ௞ିௗሻ௅ೖ୻ሺିௗሻ୻ሺ௞ାଵሻ .ஶ௞ୀ଴      (8) 
In cases when െ ଵଶ<d< ଵଶ, the process is stationary and invertible, when d൒ ଵଶ  the process is 
non-stationary. However, the time series process is mean reverting when 
ଵଶ ൑d<1. 
Key to the assessment of the nature of the process is therefore the estimate of the order of 
integration parameter d, for which a semi parametric two-step feasible exact local whittle 
(FELW) estimator (Shimotsu, 2006) will be used. This estimator is robust to misspecification 
of the short-run dynamics and can handle stationary (d< ½) and non-stationary (d൒ ½) 
processes (Okimoto and Shimotsu, 2010). Moreover, it is unlikely to be affected by 
conditional heteroscedasticity (Robinson and Henry, 1998; Shao and Wu, 2007), which is a 
common characteristic of electricity price series. Following, Lopes and Mendes (2006) in the 
analysis that follows the bandwidth m for estimating the FELW is set to 0.75. 
First, the time-varying estimates of order of integration are plotted using a rolling window of 
200 observations. These estimates are smoothed with Hodrick-Prescott’s (1997) filter with a 
smoothing parameter equal to 250. Secondly, one hundred perturbed series are obtained by 
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adding a random noise (N(0,1)) to the original time series. Their order of integration, d, is 
then estimated using the FEWL based on 260 observations, corresponding to a period of one 
year, both before (d_before) and after (d_after) the closure of the eighth nuclear plant. Mean 
estimates in each period (before and after) are then used to test the hypotheses with standard t-
tests. 
 5.3 Assessing market integration: a Fractional Cointegration Analysis  
To test for electricity spot price convergence (Hypothesis 2b), the fractional cointegration 
framework (Granger, 1986; Engle and Granger, 1986; Johansen, 1988) is adopted. The aim is 
to establish co-movement of fractionally integrated time series, i.e.: Two time series ݔ௧ 
and ݕ௧, integrated of order d, (I(d)) are said to be fractionally cointegrated of order (d, b) if 
the error correction term given by 
 ݖ௧ ൌ ݕ௧ െ ߚ כ ݔ௧         (9) 
is fractionally integrated of order b, where 0 < b ≤ d (Banerjee and Urga, 2005). First, a t-test 
is carried out to assess if ݔ௧ and ݕ௧are integrated of the same order. When the order of 
integration of the two time series, ݔ௧ and ݕ௧, are not significantly different, the error 
correction term ሺݖ௧ሻ is computed via an ordinary least square regression of ݔ௧ on ݕ௧. 
Subsequently, the order of integration of the error correction term, ݖ௧ , is estimated using the 
FELW estimator, and tested: if this value is significantly smaller than the common order of 
integration d of the time series ݔ௧ and ݕ௧, then cointegration is established.  
5.4 Data  
The dataset consists of electricity spot prices from eight European electricity spot markets: 
APX-NL (Netherlands), APX-UK (GB), BELPEX (Belgium), EPEX-DE (Germany), EPEX-
FR (France), NORDPOOL (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, plus Estonia (from 2010) 
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and Lithuania (from 2012)), OMEL (Portugal and Spain) and SWISSIX (Switzerland) 
covering the period from 2 November 2009 to 9 October 2012. The analysis focuses on week-
daily (Monday to Friday) mean of prices (base load), thus comprising 767 observations for 
each market.  
Hourly forecasts and actual electricity output generated by wind were obtained from the 
Transparency in Energy Markets EEX database (www.transparency.eex.com). These time 
series are also converted to a week-daily frequency (Monday-Friday), and then divided by the 
daily volume traded on the German spot market, thus providing the share of wind power that 
is traded on the day, which will be referred to as actual ‘Wind Power’ and forecasted ‘Planned 
Wind Power’ penetration time series. Table 1 summarises the electricity spot prices of the 
different markets in €/MWh as well as the two wind power penetration time series. The data 
distributions reject normality: the Jarque-Bera statistics exceed their critical values, and all 
markets, except OMEL, exhibit positive skewness; high kurtosis (extreme values) is also 
observed, especially in EPEX-FR. 
Table 1 here 
Table 2 summarises the smoothed (outlier-treated) time series of spot prices, ‘planned wind’ 
and ‘actual wind’ penetration in the period from 6 August 2010 to 6 August 2012, which are 
used to test hypotheses 2a and 2b. Average electricity prices, in the different markets, range 
from 45.10€/MWh (Nord Pool) to 57.47€/MWh (SWISSIX) as reported in column 3. The last 
column contains the estimate for the order of integration d, based on which the speed of mean 
reversion of each time series can be assessed: the lower this value, the quicker spot prices 
revert to their mean. Accordingly, APX-UK (d= 0.489) had the fastest speed of mean 
reversion in the period. By contrast, the highest values of d are observed for EPEX-FR and 
Nord Pool (0.906 and 0.862, respectively). The EPEX-FR, in particular, is very close to one, 
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suggesting that the market would have reacted very slowly to unexpected supply or demand 
shocks.  
Table 2 here 
6. Results  
6.1 Time-varying correlations with German wind power penetration and changes in price 
dynamics 
Following model selection criteria, the best and most parsimonious fits to the univariate time 
series were achieved by ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) models with t-distributed errors. This 
specification confirms the changing volatility (heteroscedasticity) and the spiky nature of the 
time series (some high kurtosis, as shown in Table 1). Accordingly, wind penetration levels, 
spot prices, and their volatilities are influenced by the previous values and shocks. Plots of the 
estimated correlations in the period confirmed that all associations are time-varying.  
Tables 3 and 4 show the average correlations in each period using the TTDCC model, values 
before 6 August 2011 are shown in the top triangle of each table, while those after this date 
are shown in the bottom triangle. Overall, there are more significant associations after 6 
August 2011. The 31 significant (1% level) correlations in Table 3 range from 0.17 (for APX-
NL and OMEL, as well as OMEL and SWISSIX) to 0.97 (BELPEX and EPEX-FR).  In Table 
4, where the data includes ‘Planned Wind Power’ rather than actual wind power, 30 
correlations are significant at 1% level and are within the same range - from 0.17 (for APX-
NL and OMEL) to 0.97 (BELPEX and EPEX-FR). Given the break point tests (one tailed t-
tests), seven (Table 3) and eight (Table 4) of the estimated correlations have increased, when 
comparing the averages before 6 August 2011 (top triangle) with the averages after 6 August 
2011 (bottom triangle), and they are highlighted in bold.2  
                                                            
2 Plots and one-tailed t-test results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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Average correlation coefficients after 6 August 2011 for ‘Wind Power’ and ‘Planned Wind 
Power’ are shown in the last row and column (9) in both tables. The correlations between 
wind power penetration levels and spot price returns are generally negative: the number of 
significant associations with ‘Wind Power’ (Table 3) increased from two (column 9) to seven 
(last row) when one compares the period before to after 6 August 2011. The two models are 
consistent with respect to those associations that increased significantly (5% significance 
level): only the strength of associations between German wind power levels and spot prices in 
BELPEX and EPEX-FR increased in the period. As expected, the correlation is negative, thus 
the greater the level of German wind power, the lower the spot prices in these markets. The 
time-varying volatility of German wind power also implies that when correlations are 
significant, as shown in the last rows and columns of Tables 3 and 4, there is volatility 
transmission between German wind power and spot prices, and this is the case in the German 
and all other markets, except OMEL.   
 
Table 3 here 
Table 4 here 
The correlations between electricity spot price returns and volatilities are on average positive, 
as shown in Tables 3 and 4. In general, associations are stronger the closer and more 
connected the markets are. Before 6 August 2011, the average correlations ranged from 0.42 
(BELPEX and SWISSIX) to 0.84 (BELPEX and EPEX-FR) in the model that included ‘Wind 
Power’ (Table 3), and from 0.18 (APX-UK and SWISSIX) to 0.99 (BELPEX and EPEX-FR) 
in the model with ‘Planned Wind Power’ (Table 4). When compared to other markets, spot 
prices in NORDPOOL and OMEL have fewer and weaker correlations. In the top triangle of 
Table 3, it can be seen that before 6 August 2011, spot prices in OMEL were independent of 
spot prices in the other markets. After 6 August 2011, as shown in the lower triangle of Table 
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3, although significant, the correlations are low (0.17 to 0.26).  These results are likely to 
reflect OMEL’s limited physical connection with the other markets. For example, with 
neighbouring France, interconnection represented a mere 3% of Spain’s electricity generation 
(Bilbao et al., 2011).  
NORDPOOL, however, is better connected, but is also more resilient to shocks because it has 
a more evenly distributed electricity mix and a higher share of flexible generation (Deidersen 
and Trück, 2002). With pump-storage electricity acting as a buffer, prices would be expected 
to vary less than in neighbouring markets. However, this has not been observed in the period, 
as illustrated by the standard deviations reported in Tables 1 and 2. The Nordic Market Report 
2013 (Nordic Energy Regulators, 2013) described that increases in water levels in the period 
led to increases in hydro generated electricity and decreases in thermal generation and prices. 
Consequently, there were greater variations in prices that also impacted their correlation with 
prices in other markets.  
Following the same format of the previous tables, average correlations obtained with the 
EDCC models are displayed in Tables 5 and 6, and generally confirm the results of the 
previous models. For example, in EPEX-DE, the correlation between spot prices and ‘Wind 
Power’ increased from an average of -0.42 to -0.58 (Table 5), thus supporting Hypothesis 1a 
and indicating that a greater share of the volatility of wind power would have been transmitted 
to spot prices after 6 August 2011. The average association between spot prices in EPEX-FR 
and German wind power has more than doubled: from an average of -0.18, before 6 August, 
to -0.43 (based on actual) and -0.42 (based on planned) after 6 August. Likewise, with 
BELPEX, average association increased from -0.18 to -0.41 and -0.39. 
Table 5 here 
Table 6 here 
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The stronger association with ‘Planned Wind Power’ in comparison to the actual level of 
wind power that is observed in both models is not surprising. Forecasts for the day-ahead are 
made publicly available by the transmission systems operators, and therefore wind power 
expectations can be incorporated into prices. Overall, there is limited support for increases in 
the associations with German wind power after the closures of the eight nuclear plants, as 
stated in Hypothesis 1a, since only two associations between wind power penetration and 
electricity spot prices became significantly stronger after 6 August 2011. Yet, most 
associations between German wind power and spot prices are significant at 1% level, 
consequently the data show volatility transmission from German wind power to spot prices, 
not just locally, but also in all markets except for OMEL. 
Given greater volatility in electricity spot markets, an increase in the volume traded in 
forward markets would be expected. Indeed, month-ahead German base-load trade data 
obtained from Tullett Prebon Information for the period from August 2010 to August 2012 
show increases in traded volumes and number of trades after the plant closures. Comparing 
one year before with one year after 6 August 2011, the number of trades in German base load 
grew by more than 35%, from 3484 to 5375; and traded volumes increased by 28%, from 
45.6TWh to 63.2TWh. When the nuclear plant closures were announced, one-month-ahead 
prices of base load moved from their mean average of 50.3 €MWh to 62 €/MWh. However, in 
a few month prices converged towards 40 €/MWh. Furthermore, despite an increased demand 
for base-load contracts, a decrease in the average price per MWh paid from an average of 52.3 
€/MWh to 48.53 €/MWh is observed when comparing one year before with one year after 6 
August 2011. These data support the inference that the capacity reduction in the German 
electrical system was offset by rising shares of wind power.  
Since most average correlations between spot prices are significant, there is evidence of 
volatility transmission of spot prices across EU electricity markets. As for specific 
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associations with German spot prices, few associations have actually increased in the period 
analysed. Although increases in average correlation vary with the model that was estimated, 
they relate to spot markets that share borders with Germany, namely: EPEX-FR, BELPEX, 
SWISSIX, and APX-NL. Hence, there is some support for Hypothesis 1b, which states that 
spot price volatility transmission would have increased after the closure of the German 
nuclear plants. Yet, results seem to suggest that if there were impacts, these were limited to 
some neighbouring markets.  
6.1 Changes in mean reversion in the spot market 
Figure 2 depicts the time-varying estimates of the order of integration (d) of electricity spot 
prices between January 2010 and October 2012. Considering NORDPOOL spot prices, 
increasing values of the parameter d can be observed briefly after March 2011, and thus there 
is a decrease in the speed of mean reversion. By contrast, an abrupt drop in the order of 
integration of British spot prices can be noticed soon after April 2011, thus indicating a faster 
speed of mean reversion. In summary, there are signs of divergence in electricity price 
dynamics in the second quarter of 2011, which will be further investigated. 
Figure 2 here 
The sample means of the estimated ds of the perturbed spot price series, their confidence 
intervals and the results of the t-tests are summarised in Table 7, and broadly confirm the 
observations that were made based on Figure 2. Confidence intervals for the means of ds that 
are shown in the third column tend to overlap in the period before 6 of August, thus 
suggesting that differences in the speed of mean reversion were not significant in this period. 
After 6 August, however, some confidence intervals do not overlap: APX-UK has a lower 
interval when comparing to all markets bar OMEL; NORDPOOL and SWISSIX have higher 
intervals when compared to EPEX-DE, APX-UK, and OMEL. There are signs of divergence 
22 
 
and decreases in mean reversion for most spot prices. According to one-sided t-tests, for 
which the statistics are shown in the last column of Table 7, the parameter d has increased for 
all spot prices, except in OMEL and APX-UK. For the former, there is no significant change 
in the parameter d and for APX-UK there is a decrease that may, however, be explained by 
the greater competitiveness in the period of flexible gas-generated electricity, due to low fuel 
costs (European Commission, 2011), rather than the association with other European markets. 
In all, Hypothesis 2a is supported, since the speed with which electricity spot prices revert to 
their mean decreased in all markets apart from those that are less connected to the German 
market. 
Table 7 here 
6.2 Changes in convergence of electricity spot prices 
Given the above findings, the process of convergence to a common price is likely to have 
changed. Table 8 summarises t-tests that assess the Null hypothesis of a common order of 
integration for pairs of markets before (above diagonal) and after (below diagonal) 6 August 
2011. These results broadly confirm the general observations based on the 95% confidence 
intervals in Table 7. Before 6 August 2011, twenty pairs did not reject the null of a common 
order of integration. By contrast, after 6 August 2011, the null hypothesis is rejected for most 
pairs (as shown below the diagonal in Table 8). None of the spot prices had a common order 
of integration with spot prices in APX-UK. This result further highlights the different in price 
dynamics between the British and the other EU spot markets in this study, which is likely to 
be due to the limited interconnection between them. 
Table 9 considers all pairs of time series that have previously been found to have a common 
order of integration. Cointegration tests are summarised; significant differences at 5% level 
are indicated by asterisks, and show that before 6 August (top triangle), five market pairs were 
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integrated. After this date (bottom triangle), nine pairs were integrated. Nonetheless, the 
cointegrated pairs differ: after 6 August 2011, no market was integrated with EPEX-DE, 
while before that date APX-NL and SWISSIX were. Overall, the hypothesis of less 
integration within EU electricity spot markets is rejected. There are indications of a decoupled 
German electricity market after the nuclear plant closures. In addition, the results in Table 9 
also show increasing integration between BELPEX, APX-NL, NORDPOOL and EPEX-FR. 
Table 8 here 
Table 9 here 
7. Discussion  
The empirical findings show that wind power can no longer be neglected in studies of the 
integration of European electricity markets. Wind power penetration levels in Germany were 
found to be negatively associated with spot prices in Germany but also in other markets. In 
the long run, increasing levels of wind power can lead to lower wholesale prices. The 
drawback is that there is also evidence of volatility transmission. Given that positive short-run 
associations across EU electricity spot markets were also found and are stronger the closer 
and better connected the markets are, with the combination of increasing wind power 
generation and market integration, electricity spot prices are likely to become more volatile.  
 Participants in an integrated day-ahead market will need to trade off the additional price risk 
with the expectation of lower prices in high-wind scenarios. On the one hand, larger suppliers 
could make more use of future contracts, but in doing so they would miss opportunities of 
lower prices, their final price would then be more expensive to the consumers. High-wind 
scenarios could therefore benefit smaller suppliers, who could then more quickly pass on 
lower prices to the consumer. On the other hand, in high-wind scenarios, the more expensive 
flexible generators become less attractive investments (Paraschiv et al., 2014; Traber and 
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Kemfert, 2011), they would have to rely on capacity payments and make more use of take or 
pay contracts. In all, there are greater incentives for hedging and more flexible contracts, 
options (e.g. swings, recalls and nominations), and greater use of contracts for differences 
between generators and suppliers.  
Cross-border electricity trading is dependent on price differentials. A main finding of this 
study, which is in line with recent studies (e.g. Castagneto-Gissey et al., 2014), is that the 
dynamics of electricity spot prices in European markets are time-varying. Consequently, price 
differentials in the short run are time-varying, thus making the task of forecasting 
interconnector flows more difficult for transmission operators. This is a challenge, as 
historical data on price differentials become less reliable, but is also an opportunity for greater 
share of information in the European electricity supply chain. Reliable estimates of trade 
flows are likely to be important for future capacity assessments in Europe, since the 
decommissioning of old plants in the UK and the phasing-out of nuclear plants in Belgium, 
Switzerland and Germany have led to concerns about the nations’ abilities to secure supply in 
the near future.  
The results also show that spot prices in OMEL and APX-UK were less affected by 
developments in central European markets. This finding reinforces the role of interconnection 
in electricity markets, as highlighted in the review of the literature and observed in the 
particular case of OMEL. It is noteworthy that Britain has interconnectors with France and the 
Netherlands, where price differentials (as shown in Tables 1 and 2) would have favoured 
imports to Britain, these interconnections seem to have been used in congestion management 
during the period analysed and therefore would not have a significant share in the day-ahead 
market. Britain is also interconnected with Ireland, with price differentials mostly favouring 
exports. Yet, as McInerney and Bunn (2013) described in their analysis of the Moyle 
interconnector, transmission capacity rights have been undervalued and some flows were 
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found to be opposite to the efficient direction. The authors’ explanations for inefficiencies 
include intermittent wind power and the strategic behaviour of dominant firms. As a whole, 
undersubscription of transmission rights and other uncertainties related to interconnection 
have meant that the transmission operator and the recent UK capacity market auctions 
considered interconnectors at float for transmission planning. However, the situation is 
changing, because interconnectors are becoming more responsive since February 2014 as a 
consequence of market coupling. Moreover, with the planned increases in interconnection and 
future targets for market coupling, interconnectors are likely to play a greater role in the day-
ahead market. Consequently, significant shifts are expected in the relatively low and stable 
correlations that were estimated in this study. 
In addition, the higher average short-run correlations (greater than 0.70), which were observed 
between spot prices in BELPEX and SWISSIX with their larger neighbouring markets, appear 
to support previous observations that in well-connected electricity markets price volatility 
transmissions are in the direction of the smaller markets (e.g. Zareipour et al., 2007). This 
may be a cause for concern, and further investigation is desired covering a wider period, and 
in the case of BELPEX, a longer range study of market volatility pre and post market 
coupling would enable a clearer assessment. 
Faced with a more volatile electricity supply, smart technology has been advocated (e.g. 
Strbac, 2008) and targets have been set at European and national levels (e.g. DECC, 2013). In 
this context, virtual power plants that aggregate decentralised sources of generation or pool 
together large consumers that can temporarily reduce their electricity consumption have been 
presented as efficient solutions or means to reduce dependency in interconnection to secure 
supply. They can decrease price volatility by flattening demand peaks. In doing so, 
investment signals are also reduced, but the trade-off is that in low-wind scenarios, they can 
contribute to capacity. So far, their volumes are relatively small, but as 2020 approaches, 
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these potentially local changes in demand and supply will be of relevance to the analysis of 
the short-run covariance of spot prices in connected markets.  
The long-run dynamics of the eight spot markets, which were analysed, imply that during the 
year after the closure of Germany’s nuclear plants, supply or demand shocks were less easily 
overcome. The speed with which prices reverted to their mean decreased for all markets, 
except for OMEL and APX-UK, which are not directly connected to the German market. This 
observed change in mean reversion suggested that market integration might have been 
affected by the change in Germany’s electricity mix. Indeed, the German market was no 
longer integrated with the two markets that it had been in the year before.  This finding could 
mean that the largest and most liquid market would no longer be acting as a signal to 
neighbouring markets, as previously described in the literature (e.g. Bollino et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, several other market pairs were integrated, and thus the long-run market 
convergence may be more resilient to changes in a central market than might have been 
expected. Furthermore, considering the markets that became more integrated in the period 
analysed, there is some evidence that market coupling has played its expected role in the path 
towards a single market for electricity.  
In an integrated price-coupled market, power flows between two regions would be based on 
bids and offers in both power exchanges to establish the market clearing prices and the 
owners of interconnectors would be remunerated according to the total flow in the period.  
Yet, as McInerney and Bunn (2013) warned, given the challenge of integrating market 
systems and infrastructure, explicit auctions for interconnector capacity will remain for some 
time in Europe. Consequently, as Gebhardt and Hoeffler (2013) observed when analysing 
different interconnectors with Germany, there can be significant variations in relationship 
between interconnector prices and spot prices. Power flows in interconnectors may not 
support expectations that are based on price differentials, thus the authors concluded that 
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informed players were not engaging in cross-border trading. Gebhardt and Hoeffler (2013) 
therefore conjectured that where markets are concentrated, big players may collude and 
forego the use of an interconnector. By not engaging in cross-border trading, they maintain 
their local dominant status. It is therefore possible that lack of competition could partially 
explain some of the low correlations that were observed in the present study. Regulators in 
connected markets should closely coordinate the monitoring of anti-competitive behaviour, 
since, as highlighted by Castagneto-Gissey (2014), the level of competition also impacts 
electricity prices in European markets. Nonetheless, the expectation remains that with market 
coupling price correlations increase, as observed in the results. Given that wind power 
penetration levels were found to be important in assessments of market integration, a 
limitation of the present study is that wind power levels in the other markets and different 
types of RES/E were not considered due to lack of access to reliable data. The analysis 
focused on daily average spot prices from Monday to Friday, which simplified the 
econometric modelling by eliminating seasonal effects.  A drawback of this simplification is 
that inferences cannot be made concerning intra-day variations, especially peak periods. The 
statistical tests enable the identification of changes in patterns, some of which were in line 
with the hypotheses, correlations and differences were observed but causality is not implied. 
The findings are robust insofar as it is possible to conclude that the short-run variance and 
covariance as well as the long-run dynamics of European spot prices are changing, and these 
associations may react to special events.  
8. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Our findings suggest that the amount of interconnection and RES-E in European electricity 
markets can no longer be neglected by policy makers when they are legislating and planning 
for the long term. As highlighted, if prices are positively correlated, the combined price 
volatility is higher than the sum of individual volatilities, thus market players can be exposed 
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to greater price risk from interconnection. Although volatility is desired because it stimulates 
trading and encourage the participation of financial institutions and other players in electricity 
markets, thus making markets more liquid and competitive, too much volatility can hinder 
investments in infrastructure and capacity. Moreover, a traditional regulatory response to high 
volatility in a market is the establishment of price caps. In connected markets, price caps 
should be a  agreed upon by consensus, whose estimate should include markets that are not 
directly connected; otherwise, in a period of scarcity power flows would be in the direction of 
the higher price cap. In short, given the interactions and constraints in the electric system, co-
ordinated policies and information sharing between connected electricity markets are vital.  
Currently, different national policies for integrating RES-E are in place and there is variation 
in how nations are dealing with their capacity assessments. In fact, the European market 
coupling project does not address capacity, and its independence from capacity assessments 
can be problematic in the long run. Electricity, at the end of the day, is a common good: faced 
with local social and institutional pressures national governments react and quick reactions in 
interconnected energy markets can have unwanted consequences. Overall, the ability of an 
integrated energy market to secure supply and minimize the cost to consumers call for greater 
coordination and innovation in policy and regulation at the European level. National policies 
are responsible for securing supply and energy mixes are decided by each state, where 
institutional pressures may not allow policy makers enough time for consultations.  However, 
in the absence of a coordinated European-wide capacity assessment, the resilience of the 
electricity markets to shocks that could result from market integration is constrained.  In fact, 
the findings of this study also highlight the potential for volatility transmission across energy 
markets, especially in the direction of the gas market, which should be further investigated 
and monitored. 
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 In conclusion, the present study highlights challenges associated with isolated energy policies 
in the context of achieving the goals of a single European electricity market and RES-E 
targets. A fully co-ordinated European approach to energy policy appears indispensable, but 
clearly is not easily achievable. Nonetheless, a single Europe-wide capacity assessment of 
national policies, in the interim, would enable each electricity market to estimate the 
consequences of their policies in other markets and anticipate reactions from different 
perspectives. Moreover, the greater sharing of information between the different market 
participants, regulators and policy-makers that such an assessment would require could also 
facilitate monitoring of the behaviour of dominant market participants and help in removing 
barriers to full market coupling. Hence, a single Europe-wide capacity assessment is needed 
and would be a significant step forward in the path to an integrated energy market in Europe.    
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Figure 1: Electricity Generation Capacity & Peak Load in Germany - January 2011. 
Source BDEW, 2011. 
 
Figure 2: Order of Integration (d) of Electricity Spot Prices – time series from January to November 2012. 
 
 
51.1
4.8
9.7
7.2
6.3
3.5
22.1
41.4
50.7
19.3
20.3
16.9
67.1
80.6
12.5
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Available Capacity Secured Capacity Load
RES‐E Hydro Others Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Unsecured Capacity Load Remaining Capacity
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
01/2010 04/2010 07/2010 10/2010 01/2011 04/2011 07/2011 10/2011 01/2012 04/2012 07/2012 10/2012
d_Nordpool d_Omel d_APX-NL d_EPEX-DE
d_APX-UK d_EPEX-FR d_Belpex d_Swissix
 
41 
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics – spot prices in the different markets and wind power penetration in Germany 
  Min Mean Max Std. Dev Skew. Kurt. 
APX-NL 21.04 50.08 98.98 7.7 0.32 3.24 
APX-UK 30.52 52.12 130.81 8.81 1.46 11.27 
BELPEX 15.11 49.86 111.92 9.53 0.94 5.76 
EPEX-DE 7.21 48.98 98.98 8.61 0.17 2.84 
EPEX-FR 15.13 51.04 367.60 15.65 11.45 219.22 
NORDPOOL 7.94 45.21 134.8 16.61 0.63 1.55 
OMEL 3.13 44.50 67.35 10.18 -1.05 1.49 
SWISSIX 15.66 55.33 155.32 11.63 1.85 13.27 
Wind Power 0.01 0.18 0.86 0.13 1.37 2.42 
Planned Wind Power 0.02 0.19 0.85 0.13 1.30 2.11 
Minimum (Min), mean, maximum (Max) and standard deviation (Std. Dev); skewness (Skew.), excess kurtosis (Kurt.); prices in 
€/MWh. 
Table 2: Summary statistics and estimated speed of mean reversion of smoothed spot price time series 
  Min Mean Max Std. Dev Skew. Kurt. d  
APX-NL 36.36 52.49 98.98 6.79 1.17 7.82 0.695 
APX-UK 41.5 54.83 100.21 6.24 1.84 12.48 0.489 
BELPEX 25.38 52.12 111.92 9.14 1.59 10.46 0.835 
EPEX-DE 27.67 51.5 98.98 8.01 0.69 5.92 0.615 
EPEX-FR 25.38 52.49 147.25 10.75 2.98 22.25 0.906 
NORDPOOL 7.94 45.10 103.25 17.46 0.4 3.35 0.862 
OMEL 16.16 49.49 65.31 6.60 -0.78 5.66 0.614 
SWISSIX 31.05 57.47 155.32 11.98 2.41 18.44 0.782 
Minimum (Min), mean, maximum (Max) and standard deviation (Std. Dev); skewness (Skew.), excess kurtosis (Kurt.); prices in 
€/MWh; d is the order of integration estimated using the FELW estimator with m=0.75: the higher this value the lower is the 
speed that the series reverts to its mean. 
Table 3: TDCC Average Correlations – Before 6 August 2011 (top triangle) & After 6 August 2011 (bottom triangle) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 EPEX-FR  0.47*** 0.61*** 0.00 0.20 0.53*** 0.12 0.84*** -0.06 
2 EPEX-DE 0.85***  0.51*** 0.10 0.02 0.32* 0.03 0.43*** -0.43*** 
3 APX-NL 0.86*** 0.89***  0.16 0.24 0.46*** 0.15 0.71*** -0.28*** 
4 NORDPOOL 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.31***  0.00 0.05 0.18 -0.05 -0.15 
5 OMEL 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.10  0.16 -0.09 0.33* 0.04 
6 SWISSIX 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.29*** 0.17***  -0.10 0.42*** -0.11 
7 APX-UK 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.07 0.00 0.21***  0.15 0.06 
8 BELPEX 0.97*** 0.85*** 0.9*** 0.30*** 0.24 0.73*** 0.25***  -0.06 
9 Wind Power -0.41*** -0.56*** -0.48*** -0.29*** -0.08 -0.31*** -0.15*** -0.30***   
*, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance level; significant changes in bold. 
  
Table 4: TDCC Average Correlations – Before 6 August 2011 (top triangle) & After 6 August 2011 (bottom triangle) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 EPEX-FR 
 
0.68*** 0.79*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.59*** 0.21*** 0.99*** -0.14*** 
2 EPEX-DE 0.84*** 
 
0.82*** 0.39*** 0.12** 0.54*** 0.21*** 0.68*** -0.48*** 
3 APX-NL 0.86*** 0.89*** 
 
0.35*** 0.16*** 0.64*** 0.25*** 0.8*** -0.42*** 
4 NORDPOOL 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.32*** 0.00 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.29*** -0.20*** 
5 OMEL 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.17** 0.11 0.24*** -0.02 0.22*** -0.01 
6 SWISSIX 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.29*** 0.17 0.18*** 0.60*** -0.25*** 
7 APX-UK 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.07 0.00 0.21*** 
 
0.22*** -0.11 
8 BELPEX 0.97*** 0.85*** 0.90*** 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.73*** 0.25*** 
 
-0.15*** 
9 Planned Wind Power -0.40*** -0.54*** -0.45*** -0.30*** -0.09 -0.29*** -0.14*** -0.37*** 
*, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance level; significant changes in bold. 
Table 5: EDCC Average Correlations - Before 6 August 2011 (top triangle) & After 6 August 2011 (bottom triangle) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 EPEX-FR 
 
0.71*** 0.83*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.58*** 0.19*** 1.00*** -0.18*** 
2 EPEX-DE 0.84*** 
 
0.83*** 0.39*** 0.11* 0.54*** 0.19*** 0.71*** -0.42*** 
3 APX-NL 0.86*** 0.88*** 
 
0.32*** 0.15* 0.65*** 0.23*** 0.84*** -0.40*** 
4 NORDPOOL 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.27*** 
 
0.01 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.27*** -0.19*** 
5 OMEL 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.09 
 
0.20*** -0.01 0.20*** 0.01 
6 SWISSIX 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.27*** 0.16** 
 
0.15*** 0.58*** -0.26*** 
7 APX-UK 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.08 -0.02 0.20*** 
 
0.20*** -0.11* 
8 BELPEX 0.97*** 0.84*** 0.90*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.71*** 0.26*** 
 
-0.18*** 
9 Wind Power -0.43*** -0.58*** -0.49*** -0.28*** -0.08 -0.31*** -0.15*** -0.41*** 
 
*, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance level; significant changes in bold. 
  
Table 6: EDCC Average Correlations – Before 6 August 2011 (top triangle) & After 6 August 2011 (bottom triangle) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 EPEX-FR 
 
0.72*** 0.84*** 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.58*** 0.19*** 1.00*** -0.18*** 
2 EPEX-DE 0.84*** 
 
0.83*** 0.39*** 0.10 0.54*** 0.20*** 0.72*** -0.46*** 
3 APX-NL 0.86*** 0.88*** 
 
0.32*** 0.15*** 0.65*** 0.23*** 0.84*** -0.42*** 
4 NORDPOOL 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 
 
0.01 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.26*** -0.20*** 
5 OMEL 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.15** 0.09 
 
0.20*** -0.01 0.19*** -0.01 
6 SWISSIX 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 
 
0.15*** 0.59*** -0.28*** 
7 APX-UK 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.08 -0.02 0.20*** 
 
0.20*** -0.10* 
8 BELPEX 0.97*** 0.84*** 0.90*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.71*** 0.26*** 
 
-0.18*** 
9 Planned Wind Power -0.42*** -0.55*** -0.46*** -0.29*** -0.09 -0.29*** -0.15*** -0.39*** 
 
*, **, *** 10%, 5% and 1% significance level; significant changes in bold.  
 
Table 7: Estimated order of integration (speed of mean reversion) - one year before and one year after 6 August 2011 
  Mean (Confidence Interval) t-statistics 
1 EPEX-DE d_before  0.591 [.458; .728] 2.130** 
d_after  0.736 [.603; .870] 
2 BELPEX d_before  0.792 [.658;.925] 2.847** 
d_after  0.985 [.852; 1.119] 
3 APX-NL d_before  0.624 [.491; .758] 4.225*** 
d_after  0.912 [.778; 1.045] 
4 EPEX-FR d_before  0.793 [.660;.926] 2.994** 
 d_after  0.996 [.863; 1.130]  
5 OMEL d_before  0.571[.438; .710] 0.862 
 d_after  0.629 [.496; .827]  
6 SWISSIX d_before  0.665[.532; .763] 5.921** 
d_after  1.068[.935; 1.202] 
7 NORDPOOL  d_before  0.784 [.651; .918] 1.708* 
d_after  1.012 [.879; 1.146] 
8 APX-UK d_before  0.623[.490; .736] 3.429*** 
d_after  0.395 [.262; .528] 
Order of integration is denoted d. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
  
Table 8: Tests of differences in order of integration between spot prices in pairs of markets 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 EPEX-DE 
 
-2.944** -0.484 -2.959** 0.304 -1.088 0.784  1.087 
2 BELPEX -3.662** 
 
2.460** -0.015 3.249** 1.856 0.106 1.880 
3 APX-NL -2.581** 1.081 -2.475** 0.788 -0.604 -2.354** 0.602 
4 EPEX-FR -3.824 -0.162 -1.243 2.400** 1.871 0.121 -1.866 
5 OMEL 1.572 5.234** 4.153** 5.396** -1.393 -3.143** -1.748 
6 SWISSIX -4.884** -1.222 -2.31** -1.060 -6.456** -1.75 1.381 
7 NORDPOOL  -4.057** -0.396 -1.477 -0.234 -5.629** -0.826 
 
0.617 
8 APX-UK -5.009** -8.829** -7.595** -8.668** -9.064** -3.437** -9.886**  
Null hypothesis: Common order of integration d of market i and market j, i, j=1, 8. Before (top triangle) and after (bottom 
triangle) 6 August 2011. The asterisks ** denote t-statistic significant at 5% significance level.  
Table 9: Tests of cointegration between pairs of spot prices with common order of integration 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 EPEX-DE   
 
0.191**  
 
0.571  0.425**  0.791  0.449 
2 BELPEX 
 
    0.184** 
 
0.467** 0.665 0.590 
3 APX-NL 
 
0.389 **   0.564 0.590 0.499  
 
0.457 
4 EPEX-FR 
 
0.250** 0.574**   0.826 0.472**   0.592 
5 OMEL 0.701 
   
  0.532 
 
0.464 
6 SWISSIX 
 
0.644** 
 
0.496 **     0.781  0.515 
7 NORDPOOL  
 
0.446 ** 0.447 ** 0.240** 
 
0.638**   0.567 
8 APX-UK 
       
 
Order of integration d for residual series ݖ௧for all market pairs that share a common order of integration. Before (top triangle) and 
after (bottom triangle) 6 August 2011. The asterisks ** denote 5% significance level. 
